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Commentary Introduction
On October 10, 2008, in a 4-3 decision, the Connecticut Supreme
Court held that it was a violation of the Constitution of the State of
Connecticut to prohibit same-sex couples from entering into a marriage.
The decision in Kerrigan v. Department of Public Health established
Connecticut as the third state, following Massachusetts and California
(which later reversed its position on same-sex marriage), to recognize the
right of same-sex couples to marry. The Kerrigan decision is unique since
the state previously passed legislation allowing civil unions, which granted
all of the rights of marriage to same-sex couples but did so under a
different nomenclature.
In Kerrigan, the plaintiffs argued that the state’s civil union law was
unconstitutional and discriminatory because it established a separate and
unequal institution for a minority class. The Connecticut Supreme Court
agreed, holding that sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect classification
demanding a heightened level of review. The Court found that the state
had “failed to establish adequate reason to justify the ban” and concluded
that excluding same-sex marriage violated equal protection principles
within the state constitution.
Following the decision, the national debate regarding same-sex
marriage has only intensified. Since the ruling, two states, Iowa and
Vermont, have legalized same-sex marriage.
Iowa legalized the
matrimony through a state Supreme Court ruling and Vermont did the
same through legislation. On the other end of the spectrum, Arizona,
California, and Florida all passed state constitutional amendments defining
marriage as between only a man and a woman. As states continue to
ponder the issue of same-sex marriage, the Kerrigan decision and its
analysis will provide a powerful tool for proponents of marriage as a legal
right to all individuals, regardless of the gender of the potential spouse.
In this Commentary Issue, the Connecticut Law Review has chosen to
use the Kerrigan decision as our focal point, with each commentator
analyzing an aspect of the decision. We are fortunate to have five
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distinguished individuals share their thoughts and opinions on the decision
and its potential impact on future same-sex marriage jurisprudence. In
Changing the Immutable, Professor Susan Schmeiser of our University of
Connecticut School of Law challenges the focus on immutability that
courts often utilize when analyzing equal protection challenges to
discriminatory legislation. Schmeiser applauds the approach to the
immutability question used by the Connecticut Supreme Court and offers a
broader discussion of the development of the legal discourse towards
homosexuality to support her contention
In Marriage as Monopoly: On the Flaws of History, Tradition, and
Incrementalism Rationales for the Marriage/Civil Union Distinction,
Professor Suzanne B. Goldberg of Columbia Law School argues that the
oft used history, tradition, and incremental rationales used to support the
exclusion of same-sex marriage are flawed and without merit. Goldberg
questions why states continue to advance these rationales and why some
judges accept them. Finally, Goldberg points out the flaws inherent in
these rationales and advances arguments for why they should not be
accepted.
In From Separate to Equal: Litigating Marriage Equality in a Civil
Union State, Bennett Klein, Senior Attorney and Aids Law Project
Director at Gay and Lesbian Advocates & Defenders and co-counsel in
Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, along with Daniel Redman, an
associate at Cooley Godward Kronish LLP, discuss the historical
background of same-sex litigation. They also offer insight into the
challenges of litigating Kerrigan given the fact that Connecticut already
had a civil union bill in place that bestowed “all the same benefits,
protections and responsibilities under law . . . in a marriage” to same-sex
couples.
In Sexual Politics and Social Change: Does the Recent Democratic
Electoral Sweep Portend Progress on GLBT Rights?, Darren Hutchinson,
Professor of Law at American University, Washington College of Law,
asks whether the recent election of President Barack Obama and the
“Democratic sweep” of Congress, state legislatures, and gubernatorial
elections presents an opportunity for social movements to change the legal
status for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender (“GLBT”) individuals.
Hutchinson discusses the many political and social factors that may lead to
change for GLBT rights and asks whether the current economic conditions
may facilitate change.
Finally, in Name Calling: Identifying Stigma in the “Civil Union” /
“Marriage” Distinction, Marc R. Porier, Professor of Law at Seton Hall
Law School, focuses on the distinct injury caused by applying the term
“civil unions” to same-sex couples and “marriage” to opposite-sex couples.
In doing so, Poirier examines the facts that led the Kerrigan majority to
find a cognizable injury capable of redress when only civil unions are
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allowed for same-sex couples. In addition, Poirier expands on the harm
and social stigma that is caused when distinct names are legally recognized
for the same act by analyzing the impact language has on our society at
large.
On behalf of the Connecticut Law Review, I want to thank all of our
commentators for their timely and insightful pieces. We are honored to
publish their worthwhile articles in this Commentary Issue.
GREGORY D. SMITH, MAY 2009∗
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